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A LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF 
MODULES IN LOGIC PROGRAMMING* 
DALE MILLER 
D We present a logical language which extends the syntax of positive Horn 
clauses by permitting implications in goals and in the bodies of clauses. The 
operational meaning of a goal which is an implication is given by the 
deduction theorem: a goal D 3 G is provable from a program 9 if the goal 
G is provable from the larger program 9 U { D }. This paper explores the 
qualitative nature of this extension to logic programming. For example, if 
the formula D is the conjunction of universally quantified clauses, we 
interpret the goal D 3 G as a request to load the code in D prior to 
attempting G and then unload that code after G succeeds or fails. This 
extended use of implication provides a logical explanation of parametric 
modules, some uses of PROLOG’s assert predicate, and aspects of 
abstract datatypes. Both a model theory and proof theory are presented for 
this logical language. In particular, we show how to build a Kripke-like 
model for programs by a fixed-point construction and show that the 
operational meaning of implication mentioned above is sound and complete 
for intuitionistic logic. We also examine a weak notion of negation which is 
easily implemented in this language and show how database constraints can 
be represented by it. a 
1. IMPLICATIONS AS GOALS 
We shall assume that our logical language is a first-order language with denumer- 
ably many constants, variables, functions symbols, and predicates (at all arities). 
This language will contain the following logical constants as primitives: A (conjunc- 
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tion), V (disjunction), and 1 (implication) are binary connectives, V (for all) and 3 
(exists) are quantifiers, and J_ (falsehood) is a O-at-y logical constant. When we have 
the occasion to write negation, -B, we shall assume that it is defined as B 3) I . 
This convention will be explained in Section 7 when negation is first considered. I 
is not an atomic formula. 
Let A be a syntactic variable which ranges over atomic formulas. Let G range 
over a class of formulas, called goal formulas, to be specified shortly. We shall 
assume, however, that all atomic formulas are also goal formulas. Dejnite clauses, 
denoted by the syntactic variable D, are defined recursively as 
D :=AIGIAJVXDID, AD,. 
Definite clauses, as well as atomic and goal formulas, may contain free variables. 9 
will be a syntactic variable for sets of definite clauses. Such a set will often be called 
a program. We shall always assume that a program is a finite set. 
Let 9 be a set of definite clauses. Define [9] to be the smallest set of formulas 
satisfying the following recursive conditions: 
If D, A D, E [9] then D, E [9] and D, E [ 91. 
If V’x D E [9] then [x/t]D E [ yd] for all terms r. 
Here [x/t] D denotes the result of substituting t for free occurrences of x in D. 
In the case that G is a goal formula and 9 a set of definite clauses, we shall use 
the expression PF, G to mean that G can be derived from 9, or that G is an 
output of 9. We use the subscript 0 here to indicate that we are thinking about an 
operational definition of derivation, i.e., one that captures an intuitive sense of 
computation. No a priori relation between to and other logical senses of deriva- 
tion or validity are assumed. 
We present six proof rules for F. below. The first two are related to the 
structure of definite clauses: 
(1) 91-o A if A E [PI, and 
(2) PI-, A if there is a formula (G IA) E [9] and ~F.G. 
These two proof rules provide the basic elements needed to define recursive 
procedures. A clause of the form V’x(G IA) (where VX represents a list of 
universally quantified variables) is treated as a specification of how a procedure, the 
name of which is the head of A, can nondeterministically call other code, i.e., the 
formula G. 
To complete the description of a logic programming language, we need to 
describe the class of goal formulas and how nonatomic goals can be operationally 
proved from a program. We can define a logic equivalent to positive Horn clauses 
by letting goal formulas be defined as 
G := A]G, A G,]G, v G,]3x G 
and adding the following proof rules: 
(3) Bk,G, V G, if Bk,G, or Bt-,G,. 
(4) BtoG, A G, if PI-,G, and Pt--,G,. 
(5) PI-, 3xG if there is some term t such that PI-, (x/t]G. 
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In this context, the logical connectives A and V provide for the specification of 
nondeterministic and and or branches in the search for a derivation. The quantifier 
3 specifies an infinite nondeterministic or branch where the disjuncts are 
parametrized by the set of terms. 
A program in this logic programming language is equivalent o a conjunction of 
positive Horn clauses. For example, the definite clause 
VNY[(SxR(x, Y) A P(Y* 4) v R(z, 4 ’ p(z, Y)] 
is operationally equivalent o the definite clause 
~z~‘y~‘x[R(x, Y) A P(Y> 4 ’ p(z, Y)l 
AVztly[Nz, 4 2 PC& Y)l. 
Since this normal form exists for this version of definite clauses, the literature 
concerning the theoretical nature of positive Horn clauses generally does not present 
the syntax of this logic in this more general setting. In Section 8 we generalize this 
normal-form result for programs. 
In the rest of this paper, however, we shall assume that goal formulas have the 
following more complex syntax: 
G := AIG, A G,IG, v G,13x GID I G, 
and that there is the additional proof rule 
(6) .C@~-,D~G~~BU{D}I-,G. 
The classes of goal formulas and definite clauses are now defined by mutual 
recursion. 
The “proof rules” above are merely desired properties for the proof predicate 
to. We now formalize the meaning of t-, by presenting a sequent-style proof 
system (see [9] and [18]). A sequent is a pair, I + 0, where both the antecedent r 
and the succedent 0 are possibly empty sets of formulas. When a particular sequent 
is being displayed, we often simply enumerate the elements of succedents and 
antecedents without including set brackets. Furthermore, we shall often write I, B 
and B,r to denote I u {B}. 
Each of the proof rules (2)-(6) can be written as inference$gures in the following 
manner : 
9+G 
B+A 
(2)Y 
8+ G, 
9+ G, v G, (3), 
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Here, of course, G 3 A E [8], i = 1 or i = 2, and t is some term. In such inference 
figures, the sequent(s) appearing above the horizontal line are the upper sequent(s), 
while the sequent appearing below the line is the lower sequent. 
An O-proof for 9+ G is a tree whose nodes are labeled with sequents such that 
(i) the root node is labeled with 9 + G, (ii) the internal nodes are instances of one 
of the above inference figures, and (iii) the leaf nodes are labeled with sequents 
representing proof rule (l), i.e., with sequents of the form 9 + A where A E [PI. 
Such sequents are called initial sequents. 
We shall picture proofs as growing up from their root node. The height of a proof 
is the length of the longest path from the root to some leaf. The size of a proof is 
the number of nodes in it. 
Inference figures shall refer only to the syntactic objects used to build proofs, 
while proof rules shall refer to properties of the proof predicate I-, . The formal 
meaning of t--o can now be given as: PI-, G if there is an O-proof for 9 + G. The 
six proof rules given above are now obvious conclusions. Our interests throughout 
most of this paper will concern operational provability in its nondeterministic sense. 
That is, it will not matter if there are several such O-proofs or if a depth-first 
theorem prover could never find such a proof. 
Let gl:= {q(a), p(b) 3 r(b, a),VxVy[r(x, y) A q(y) I q(f(x))]}. The follow- 
ing is an O-proof of the goal 3x[ p(x) 13 q(f(x))] from 9’i. 
The size of this proof is 7 and its height is 6. 
Although the operational notion of O-proof is intuitive enough, it is natural to 
ask whether it is, in some sense, logical. Thus consider the following example. Let 
8, := {p(a) r\p(b) 3 q}. Is there an O-proof of 3x( p(x) 3 q) from S,? Consider 
the following tree of sequents: 
This is not a proof, because 9’*, p(a) -+ p(b) is not an initial sequent. Regardless of 
the term used to instantiate the quantifier 3x in the root sequent, this tree cannot be 
extended to an O-proof. While it seems reasonable enough that there is no such 
proof, it is important to notice that the formula 
(p(a) 444 3 4) 3 %P(x) 3 4) 
is classically provable. (A classical proof of this formula will be presented in Section 
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6.) Thus classical ogic is not sound with respect to our operational semantics. The 
actual logical status of l-d will be addressed more fully in Section 6. Until then, we 
shall simply be concerned with how t-, can be used to interpret programs. 
In this paper we will not discuss the specifics of how one might actually 
implement definite clauses into a PROLOG-like language which incorporates such 
implementation mechanisms as backtracking, logical variables, and unification. It is 
useful, however, to point out two aspects of how such an implementation would 
need to differ from a more traditional PROLOG interpreter. First, explicit quanti- 
fiers need to be used in specifying programs. In PROLOG, quantifiers in Horn 
clauses are dropped, since free variables in them can be thought of as being 
universally quantified. Similarly, free variables in goals can be thought of as being 
existentially quantified. This is not true, however, of definite clauses. For example, 
only the second of the two goal formulas 3x(Vyp(x, y) 3 4) and (VxVyp(x, y) 3 4) 
may be derived from the definite clause p(a, c) r\p(b, c) 3 q, If explicit quantifiers 
were dropped, there would be no way to differentiate correctly between these two 
goals. 
If unification and logical variables are used in the standard way to delay and 
determine substitutions, then a second difference with traditional PROLOG systems 
is forced, namely, that program clauses as well as goals can contain logical variables. 
For example, consider a goal of the form 3x(D(x) 3 G(x)), i.e., an existentially 
quantified implication in which the quantified variable can be free on both sides of 
the implication. If this quantifier is replaced with a logical (free) variable, say X, 
then the code D(X) must be added to the current program clauses before attempt- 
ing to prove G(X). When unification provides substitutions for X, both program 
clauses and goals must be updated accordingly. 
2. STORING SUCCESSFUL GOALS 
Before we examine how our extended use of implication can be used to implement 
modules, we first show how implications can be used to provide a scoped and 
temporary assert mechanism. We illustrate this mechanism by considering how to 
implement a form of memoization. 
Notice that if A is atomic, 9r!-, A A G if and only if 9t, A A [a 3 G]. The 
proof of this statement in the forward direction is trivial. The proof of the converse 
is slightly more difficult and is given below. It should be quite clear that the size of 
an O-proof of the second formula can at times be much smaller than for the first 
formula. With the second formula, A does not need to be re-proved each time it is 
needed in the proof of G. 
Consider the following PROLOG program for computing Fibonacci numbers. In 
general, we shall use the syntax of [20] to represent example programs. 
fib(O,O). 
fib(l,lI. 
fib(N,F) :- Nl is N-l, N2 is N-2, fib(Nl,Fl), 
fib(N2,F2), F is Fl+F2. 
For this example, if n is the integer value of the arithmetic expression t, then the 
sequent I + n i s t, for any set I, will be permitted as an initial sequent. If f, 
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denotes the n th Fibonacci number, then the size of the only O-proof of the goal 
f i b(n, f,) is exponential in n. 
Consider, however, the following program which employs implicational goals to 
store previously computed Fibonacci numbers. Here, we have introduced the 
symbol = > to represent implication (: - is the converse of = >): 
fib(N,M) :- memo(O,O) => memo(l,l) q > fiba(N,M,2). 
fiba(N,M,I) :- memo(N,M). 
fiba(N,M,I) :- Nl is I-l, N2 is I-2, memo(Nl,Fl), 
memo(N2,F2), F is Fl+F2, 11 is I+l, 
memo(I,F) => fiba(N,M,Il). 
In this last program, there exists only one proof of f i b( n, f,> and that proof has a 
size proportional to n. 
We now return to the formal justification of this approach to memoization. 
Theorem I. If A is atomic, l? t--o A A G if and onb if l? to A A [A 3 G]. 
PROOF. This is trivial in the forward direction. For the proof in the reverse 
direction, assume that I k0 A A [A 3 G]. Thus p t-, A and l?, A t--,G. Let T, and 
T2 be O-proofs for I + A and r, A - G, respectively. We need to construct an 
O-proof for r + G. If A E r then I = I u {A} t,G, so T2 is an O-proof for 
I -+ G. Assume that A 66 r. Build a tree, T,, by removing A from all the an- 
tecedents of sequents in T2. This tree may not be a proof for I --) G, because there 
may have been initial sequents of the form I’, A -+ A in T2 which are now of the 
form I?’ + A. These, of course, may no longer be initial sequents. Since r c I’, 
adding the definite clauses l?’ - I to all the antecedents of sequents in the proof T,, 
we can get an O-proof for I” -+ A. Thus, if we add to the top of all such noninitial 
leaves of T3 the appropriate augmented version of T,, we shall have an O-proof of 
r + G. Hence, I I-~ A A G. 0 
After we prove the equivalence of t, to intuitionistic logic in Section 6, this 
theorem is easily proven by just noting that A A G is intuitionistically equivalent to 
A A (A 1 G). 
The set of formulas which can be memoized in this fashion is slightly larger than 
the set of atomic formulas. Such a formula must have the structure of a definite 
clause and of a goal formula. Let M be a syntactic variable which ranges over the 
set of formulas described by 
M:=AIMIAIM,AM,. 
It is easy to show that a formula is a definite clause and a goal formula if and only if 
it belongs to the class of formulas satisfying this recursive definition. Notice, for 
example, that all propositional, positive Horn clauses are such formulas. 
3. IMPLEMENTING MODULES 
Consider now how we might reimplement PROLOG’s consu 1 t predicate with 
implicational goals. Let c 1 ass i f y, scanner, and m i SC be the names of files 
containing PROLOG code. When these names appear within formulas, assume that 
they refer to the conjunction of universally quantified definite clauses contained in 
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those files. Now consider the following goal: 
t,misc~((classify~G,)~(scanner~G,)r\G,). 
This goal will cause each of the three goals G,, GZ, and G, to be attempted with 
different programs. In particular, this single goal will cause the following goals to be 
attempted: 
misc,classifyI---,G,, 
misc,scannert-,G,, 
misct,G,. 
Implicational goals can, therefore, be used to structure the runtime environment of 
a program. For example, the code present in c lass i f y is essentially hidden during 
the evaluation of goal G,. This is, of course, very desirable if c 1 ass i f y and 
scanner were written by different people. This mechanism ensures that there will 
be no conflict between the predicates in these two programs. Current implementa- 
tions of logic programs generally require that all code be loaded into one area before 
it can be used. Such a lack of modularity is certainly a weakness of such implemen- 
tations. 
The previous discussion suggests that it would be possible to design a notion of 
modules for logic programming which is based entirely on the logical meaning of 
implications. To this end, we will introduce modules as named collections of clauses. 
For example, the following is a module containing some list manipulation programs. 
module lists. 
append(Cl,X,X). 
append(CUILl,X,CUIMl) :- append(L,X,M). 
member(X,CXILl) :- !. 
member(X,CYILl) :- member(X,L). 
memb(X,CXILl). 
memb(X,CYILl) :- memb(X,L). 
The theory of definite clauses we are considering in this paper does not encompass 
the cut ! operation. We shall assume, however, that in our examples it will play the 
same role in controlling backtracking as it does in PROLOG. 
According to our definitions, a goal could be of the form 3x[D(x) 3 G(x)], 
where the variable x is free in either or both D(x) and G(x). This suggests that the 
definite clauses defining a module can contain free variables. Thus a kind of 
parametric module is possible. Consider the following parametric module: 
module sort(Order). 
bsort(Ll,LZ) :- 
append(Sorted,CBig,SmalllRestl,Ll~, 
Order(Small,Big), !, 
append(Sorted,CSmall,Big~Restl,BetterLl~, 
bsort(BetterLl,L2). 
bsort(Ll,Ll). 
This example, as well as others presented later, is technically not first-order be- 
cause we have a variable which is acting as a predicate. This could be alterna- 
tively implemented using such extralogical tricks as replacing the atom 
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a 1 1 ( G 1. There is also a more direct and logical way to provide PROLOG with 
predicate variables by placing it in a higher-order logic [14,15]. Either approach 
could be used to give a meaning to this module. 
Consider using the sort module to sort the list C2,3,13 in ascending order. 
Since bso r t uses the append predicate, the 1 i s t s module must be used along 
with the sort module. The answer substitution of x in the following goal would 
provide the desired sorted list: 
I-,lists A sort(<) 13xbsort([2,3,1],x) 
It is unfortunate that in order to use the sort module it was necessary to explicitly 
reference the 1 i s t s module, which sort needed to execute successfully. It should 
be possible for the author of the sort module to import those modules which are 
needed in the sort module. Implications can again be used to provide this 
importing mechanism. For example, we could rewrite the sort module as: 
module sort(Order). 
bsdrt(Ll,L2) :- 
(lists=> 
(append(Sorted,CBig,Small~Restl,Ll~, 
Order(Small,Big), !, 
append(Sorted,CSmall,Big(Restl,BetterLl~, 
bsort(BetterLl,L2) 
1). 
bsort(Ll,Ll). 
Now we would be able to sort our list with the simple goal 
t,sort( <) 13xbsort([2,3,1], x) 
When the body of bsor t is attempted as a goal, it will come with the module 
1 i s t s as a hypothesis. Notice that the scope of the 1 i s t s module in the first 
bso r t clause is over the entire body of that clause. Clearly, its scope could be 
restricted to just cover the two append goals. This is desirable especially because, 
as the code is written above, the 1 i s t s module is imported for each recursive call 
to bso r t. For the purpose of this paper, we will assume that importing code which 
is already imported will have no cost. This is sensible from our theoretical viewpoint 
because the sequent r, D + D 3 G is provable from the sequent I?, D + G. 
For the convenience of later examples, we introduce the following definitions. Let 
the notation 9(X) denote a finite set of definite clauses all of whose free variables 
are in the variable list X. Let the symbols M, M,, M,, M, be the names of modules. 
These symbols, just like function and predicate symbols, have an arity and take 
arguments. The arguments of a module name are used to designate the formal 
parameters of that module. For our purposes here, the meaning of a module, say 
M(Z), is some set of definite clauses 9(X). This association between module names 
and definite clauses can be established by the following syntactic specifications: 
1 ,Y”l 1 ;y;I;“2(x) 1 Ejyte2kk2;:(I)) 
The first module is not parametric, because the clauses in p1 contain no free 
variables. M 1 will simply be shorthand for the conjunction of the clauses in 8,. The 
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second module is parametric, and the clauses 9, can contain various free occur- 
rences of the variable x. Finally, the third module both is parametric and explicitly 
imports M, and an instance of M,. The new syntax for importing modules is only a 
shorthand for writing certain embedded implications. In the sort module above, if 
bso r t had required several clauses, each one of them may have required the 1 i s t s 
module as a hypothesis. To save writing this hypothesis for the body of every clause, 
we introduced this syntax for imports. The intended meaning of module M, is the 
following: For each clause of the form 
VK(GM) 
in g3, replace it with one of the form 
that is, the bodies of all clauses in M, are relativized by the imported modules. The 
resulting clauses are then associated with the module name M,. Of course, variable 
capture must be avoided here. If y is a member of the list W, the bound variables 
would need to be changed before forming this new clause. 
There are two facts that are important to point out about this development of 
modules. Firstly, this notion of modules is a by-product of our definite clauses. It 
has not been added as a separate syntactic feature that an interpreter for O-proofs 
would need to understand. The meaning and use of modules could be reduced to 
uses of embedded implications. Of course, in practice this reduction would not be 
done so literally. A structure-sharing mechanism for modules would need to be 
considered. Secondly, the operational behavior of implications presented earlier is 
enough to guarantee that whenever a module is imported into another module, the 
imported module is only used privately. No additional safeguards need to be added 
to force private usage. In other words, if a module does not explicitly import a given 
module, it does not have direct access to the code in that module. 
To illustrate this fact, consider the two modules M,, which contains just the 
definite clause p, and M,, which contains the definite clause q up. Clearly, there is 
no O-proof of M 2 3 p, because there is no way to prove q within M 2. If M z were to 
import M *, there would still be no proof of q in M,. Thus, if Mi is the module 
which contains q 3 p and imports M,, there should be no O-proof of p from M;. 
This is in fact the case. The formula represented by M; is ( p I q) 2 p, and it is easy 
to check that the goal (( p I q) II, p) 3 p has no O-proof. Thus, even though M; 
imports a module which claims that p is true, it is not possible to prove p from that 
module. That is, M, is used privately within M;. It is worthwhile noting that the 
formula (( p 3 q) 3 p) I p is often called Peirce’s formula and is well known as a 
classically true but intuitionistically false formula. The restricted nature of implica- 
tion in intuitionistic logic is precisely the restriction needed to support private usage 
of modules when they are imported. In Section 6, we will discuss more about the 
connections between intuitionistic logic and k-O . 
As a final example, we give an example of how implication can be used to 
provide a block structured approach to writing code. The following single definite 
clause is a definition of the list reverse program: 
rev(L,K) :- (all K revl(Cl,K,K), 
all X all L all K (revl(CXILl,K,ACC) :- 
revl(L,K,CXIACCl))) 
=> revl(L,K,Cl). 
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Our syntax for tbrs definite clause cannot, of course, conform to the syntax of [20], 
because we need to embed quantified expressions in the body of definite clauses. 
Instead, we used the expression a 11 X P to correspond to the logical expression 
Vx P. The only time the code for the rev1 predicate is accessible is during the 
evaluation of the rev predicate. 
4. MODULES AS INTERFACES 
Modules can also be used to explicitly export and hide program code in other 
modules. For example, let module M, contain clauses for the binary predicates p 
and s and for the ternary predicate r. Consider the following module: 
module M,. 
import M,. 
q(X,Y) :- p(X,Y). 
ttx,v1 :- r(f(Y),Cl,X). 
Let M, be some module which imports M,. M, will have access to the code for 
predicate p, but only through the name q. M, will not, however, have access to the 
code for predicate s, since this is not mentioned in M,. Also, only a certain instance 
of the code for the predicate r is provided by the predicate t. Such an interfacing 
module is very similar in spirit to what O’Keefe called a breeze brick [17]. 
In this example, we have chosen to export the predicate p in M, as the predicate 
q. We could have exported p as p. For example, let M, be identical to M,, except 
thatwerellacethedefineclauseq(X,Y) :- p(X,Y) withptX,Y) :- p(X,Y). 
These clauses are, of course, simply shorthand for the definite clauses 
~x~‘y((Mt 1 P(X, y>> 1 dx, y>) and VxVy(W, 1 P(X, YN 1 P(X, y)). From an 
abstract point of view, this choice is immaterial; that is, we have the following 
equalities: 
((f,~)lhl,+#,s)) = ((w)/M,+dt,s)) = (~tdWw(t~~))~ 
Proofs for M, -+ p( t, s) can be, however, different from those for M 2 -+ p( t, s). For 
example, consider the following tree of sequents: 
wxVy((M, q+, y)) =V(x, Y)),M, --Vh d 
VxVy((M, =v(x, Y)) ~P(K Y>) + M~ 3p(t, s, (6) 
VxVy((M,q(x, Y>) =‘Ph Y)) ‘Ph s, (2). 
The search for an O-proof of p(t, s) from M, gives rise to the search of a proof for 
p(t, s) from M, and M,. Since M, does not affect the extension of p, this is, in the 
abstract sense, the same as proving p(t, s) from M,. An interpreter for O-proofs 
could, however, loop infinitely often by repeatedly using the M, code instead of 
using the M, code. Exporting p as q is one way to get around this problem. 
Consider the following tree of sequents: 
hVy((M, q(x, y)) 3 4(x, Y)),M, ‘Pet, s, 
VxVy((M, xp(x, Y)) 1 d% Y>) + M~ 3’P(t, s, (6) 
vxVy((M,q(x, Y)) 3 4(x, Y>) --) 4h s, (2). 
In this case, an interpreter is forced to examine the code in M,. 
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Returning to our first example in this section: if p was implemented in M, with 
calls to the predicate s, only p, exported as q, will be available from M,, not s. 
Hence, it is possible to hide some aspects of the actual implementation of programs. 
This is an essential feature in supporting the usual software-engineering notion of 
an abstract datatype. 
To illustrate this more directly, consider implementing binary trees which are 
labeled with integers in such a way that integers labeling the nodes to the left (right) 
of a given node are smaller (larger) than the label of the given node. The following 
module represents a particular implementation of inserting and traversing such 
trees: 
module btree_internal. 
import lists. 
insert_btree(N,bt(N,Tl,T2)). 
insert_btree(N,bttM,T,_)I :- 
N < M, insert_btree(N,T). 
insert_btree(N,bt(M,_,T)I :- 
N > M, insert_btree(N,T). 
traverse_btree(leaf,[lI. 
traverse_btree(bt(N,L,R), SortedList) :- 
traverse_btree(L,Left), traverse_btree(R, Right), 
append(Left,CNIRightl,SortedList). 
Here a particular structuring of binary trees is chosen: the term bi ( N, Tl ,T2 1 
represents a nonterminal node labeled with N and which has left subtree Tl and 
right subtree T2. Leaf nodes are represented by the constant leaf. 
Such a representation is, of course, largely arbitrary and probably of little 
significance to the rest of the program using this module. In such a case, it would be 
desirable to hide the actual implementation of such binary trees. We can do this 
with the following interfacing module: 
module btree. 
make_btree(TreeName,Goal) :- 
btree(TreeName,T) q > Goal. 
insert(TreeName,N) :- 
btree_internal => (btree(TreeName,T), 
insert_btree(N,T)). 
traverse(TreeName,L) :- 
btree_internal => (btree(TreeName,T), 
traverse_btree(T,L)). 
build(TreeName,Cl). 
build(TreeName,CX1Ll) :- 
insert(TreeName,X), build(TreeName,L). 
This module associates binary trees with user supplied names; this association is 
stored as a “temporary assert” using atomic facts of the form 
b t ree( TreeName,Tree 1. It also provides the basic manipulations (insertions 
and traversals) for such named trees. The goal make_btree(TreeName,Goal) 
wiIl call the goal Goa 1 in an environment where TreeName is associated with some 
unspecified binary tree. This tree is initialized as a logical variable. Successive calls 
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to i nse r t are used to add integer labels to this tree. The action of inserting such 
labels does not produce new copies of the binary tree; the logical variables within 
the tree are simply specified further. In a sense, this datatype represents monotone 
binary trees: such trees can grow at the leaves, but once a node is labeled with a 
value, no change can be made to it. When a binary tree is traversed, all the logical 
variables in the tree are instantiated to the constant leaf and no further insertions 
can be made. 
The following module describes a sorting procedure which uses the b t ree 
datatype. 
module btree_sort. 
import btree. 
binsort(L,K) :- make_btree(sort,(bui ld(sort,L), 
traverse(sort,K))). 
The name sort is the name of a binary tree, and all access to that tree is made 
through that name. This code is independent of the actual implementation of binary 
trees. For example, if b t ree_ i n te rna 1 attempted to balance binary trees on 
certain insertions, the meaning of the above code would not change. A user who 
imports btree_sort will only have access to the binary predicate bi nsor t. No 
other code is made available. 
The module b t r ee does not explicitly import the module b t r ee_ i n t e r na I: it 
was imported only locally in two of its three clauses. If b t ree_ i n te rna 1 
hau been imported over all three clauses, then the goal Goa 1 in 
make_btree(TreeName,Goal) would have been given access to the internal 
representation of binary trees. This would defeat the hiding mechanism. The import 
declaration often provides imported modules with too broad a scope. Explicit uses 
of = > can provide for more selective scoping. 
Although this development of abstract datatypes seems to capture many of the 
standard software-engineering otions of abstract datatypes, it does not capture all 
of them. For example, modules do not provide a perfect hiding mechanism. It is 
always possible to get at the internal structure of data objects by guessing at their 
implementation. For example, some module could reimplement the code within 
b t ree_i n te rna 1 and thus gain access to the representation of binary trees. Also, 
by simply issuing the goal btree(Name,Tree) in the right context, a user could 
get access to all the stored binary trees. Of course, this user would need to know the 
fact that they were stored in this fashion. It would seem that supporting a greater 
degree of security for abstract datatypes would require further extensions to either 
the logic or the control primitives of the progr amming language we are investigating. 
In [15] we present a further extension to definite clauses, namely the addition of 
universally quantified goals, which can be used to hide access to term constructors 
in datatypes. A discussion of this mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The code in two different modules might overlap, i.e., they could both provide 
definitions for a common predicate. For example, assume modules M, and M, both 
contain clauses for the binary predicate p. There are occasions when the desired 
meaning for p is simply the union of the clauses in M, and M,. This would be the 
case if these modules were parts of a database of facts and we wished to do a simple 
accumulation of these facts. This could be done with the following query: 
Eo M, A M, 2 =YP(X, Y). 
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Another way to bring these modules together is to view each one as being different 
versions of some program. We might then wish to find solutions to p with respect to 
the version in M, and then with respect to the version in M,. This could be done by 
first building the module: 
module Ms. 
q(X,Y) :-M, => ptX,Y). 
q(X,Y) :-M, => p(X,Y) 
and then using the query: 
t-, M, 3 3+q(x, Y>. 
When a program is placed in a module, it is often the case that we would like to 
think of that program as being completely defined within that module. That is, in all 
environments, that module should always have the same meaning. As our one 
example above showed, it is possible for a second module to be used along with a 
given module in such a way that the clauses in the two modules accumulate. For 
some programs, such an addition of foreign clauses could greatly change the original 
program’s meaning. When this is not desired, it is possible to add control primitives 
which specify that programs in modules cannot be extended. This could be done by 
explicitly using a ! , f a i 1 combination in an interfacing module. For example, 
consider the following module: 
module closedsort(Order1. 
import sort(Order1. 
binsort(Ll,L2) :- bsort(Ll,LZ); !, fail. 
This small module defines a version of bubble sort which cannot be extended with 
foreign clauses: a depth-first interpreter could never access them. 
There are numerous other observations which could be made about how this 
notion of module could be used to structure programs and search. We shall now, 
however, turn away from such concerns to study some of the formal aspects of 
definite clauses and O-proofs. 
5. MODEL THEORY 
In this section we shall present an alternative description of operational derivability. 
We shall do this by constructing a set-theoretic structure, i.e., a kind of model, such 
that 9~-, G if and only if G is satisfied in that model. The main challenge to the 
construction of such a model is the fact that a program may grow during its 
“execution”. That is, when trying to determine that PI-, G holds, it might be 
necessary to determine that B’ l-,G’ holds, where 9’ is some extension of 9. 
From the model-theory perspective, this means that an interpretation of 9 would 
depend on interpretations associated with larger programs. We therefore use an 
approach to semantics which is inspired by possible-worlds or Kripke models: we 
attempt to interpret all programs simultaneously by using a single large Kripke-like 
interpretation. It is then possible to build inductively a single interpretation which 
can then be viewed as interpreting all programs. This single interpretation will be 
the least fixed point of a suitable operator. The references [5] and [19] contain more 
on Kripke models. 
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We shall assume that we have chosen a fixed set of nonlogical constant, function, 
and predicate symbols. Let @ denote the set of all closed terms (the Herbrand 
universe), and let &’ denote the set of all closed, atomic formulas (the Herbrand 
base). Let YY be the set of all programs, and let any function Z : W- powerset( 2’) 
such that VW,, w2 E ^w[w, c w2 3 Z(w,) c Z(w,)] be called an inferpretation. An 
interpretation is simply a mapping which associates to every program a set of “ true” 
atomic formulas which is internally “monotone”, i.e., if a program gets larger, the 
set of associated true atoms cannot decrease. 
We now define each of the following for interpretations Z, and Z2: 
It follows quickly from the fact that the powerset of 2 is a complete lattice that the 
set of all interpretations is also a complete lattice under c . In this lattice, LI is the 
join operator and n is the meet operator. The smallest interpretation, I,, is given 
by setting Z,(w) :=,0 for all w E %+‘-. 
We next define a notion of satisfiability, I, w k G, for a closed goal formula G in 
an interpretation Z at a program w: 
I, w II= A if and only if A E Z(w). 
I, w I!= G, V G, if and only if I, w IF G, or I, w Ik G,. 
I, w ll= G, A G, if and only if I, w I!= G, and I, w Ik G,. 
I, w Ii= 3x G if and only if I, w Ik= [x/t]G for some t E %. 
Z,w~t=D~GifandonlyifZ,wU{D}IkG~ 
An interpretation can be thought of as a large collection of models which is 
indexed by programs. Thus, I, w I!= G means that G is true in the model located in Z 
at program w. The truth of the goal D I G in the model located at w is given by the 
truth of the goal G in the model located at w U { D }. This is how the growth of 
programs is captured. 
We now wish to build a single interpretation Z such that 9 k. G if and only if 
Z, Plk G. Such an interpretation will be the result of building a least fixed point. To 
this end, let T be a function from interpretations to interpretations defined as 
follows: 
T(Z)(w) := {AIA E [w] or 
there is a closed clause G 3 A E [ w ] such that I, w I!= G } . 
It is easy to show that T(Z) is an interpretation whenever Z is an interpretation. 
We first state two lemmas concerning the predicate I!= . Both these lemmas are 
proved using induction on the structure of goal formulas. We present the proof for 
only the second lemma. The proof of the first is similar and simpler. 
LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MODULES 93 
Lemma 2. If I, C I, then I,, w lb G implies I,, w I!= G for all w E W. 
Lemma 3. Let II r I2 E I3 E . . . be a sequence of interpretations. If G is a goal, 
WET, and LIZ, ,, I- w II= G, then there exists a k 2 1 such that I,, w I!= G. 
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of G. If G is atomic, then 
U?‘,Z,,wI!=G implies that GE(LI~~Z~)(W)=U~IZ~(W). Thus there is a k>l 
such that G E Zk( w). Hence, I,, w pi= G. Now assume that for all increasing se- 
quences of interpretations and all w E w, the lemma is true for all goal formulas 
with a given bounded size. We need to consider the following four cases. 
Case 1: G = G, A Gz. Since Ll p”=,Z;, w Ii= G, A G,, we have U y=IZ;, w II= G, 
and U” !=IZi, w I!= G,. By the inductive hypothesis, there are two positive 
integers I and j such that I,, w It= G, and I,, w I!= G,. Let k be the maximum 
of I and j. By Lemma 2, we have Zk, w Ik G, and Zk, w Ii= G,, and therefore 
Zk, w Ii= G, A G,. 
Case 2: G = G, V G,. Since U p”= IZi, w II= G, V G,, we have U p”= II;, w IF G, for 
some j = 1,2. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a positive integer k such 
that Zk, w I+ G,. Thus Zk, w Ii= G, V G,. 
Case 3: G = 3x G’. Since U zIZ1, w II= 3x G’, we have U.z,Z,, w I!= [x/t]G’ for 
some t E a. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a posmve integer k such that 
Zk, w I!= [x/t]G’. Thus Zk, w II= 3xG’. 
Case 4: G = D I G’. Since Up”=,Z;, w I= D 3 G’, we have Up”=,Z,, w U {D} It= 
G’. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a positive integer k such that 
I,. w 6 {D} It= G’. Thus -Z,, w lt= D I G’. - •I 
Notice that I,, 9lk G holds for no 9 and G, and 
and only if G is atomic and G E [9]. We now show 
continuous function on the lattice of interpretations. 
that T( I,), 91k G holds if 
that T is a monotone and 
Lemma 4. T is monotone; that is, if I, E I, then T( I,) r T( I,). 
PROOF. Assume that II E Z2, and let w E w and A E T(ZI)(w). Thus either A E [w], 
in which case A E T(Z,)( w), or there is a closed clause G 3 A E [w] such that 
II, w Ii= G. By Lemma 2, Zz, w I!= G so A E T( Z2)( w). Since w and A were arbitrary, 
we can conclude that T(Z,) c T(Z,). 0 
Lemma 5. T is continuous; that is, if I, r I2 5 I3 c . . . is a sequence of interpreta- 
tions, then 
fi T(Z,)= T 
i=l 
PROOF. To prove this equality, we prove inclusion in two directions. 
Since I, C U EIZz for any j, j 2 1, we can apply Lemma 4 to get T( Z,) c 
T( U E,Zi). Since j was arbitrary, we have U zlT(Z,) 7: 7y U 2 IZ,). 
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Let w E w and A E T( U z,Zi)(w). If A E [w] then A E T(Zj)(w) for any j, 
j 2 1, and, clearly, A E ( U zIT( Zi))( w). Otherwise, there is a closed clause G 1 
A E [w] such that U T_“-,Zi, w lb G. By Lemma 3, there is a k such that k 2 1 and 
Zk, w II= G. Thus A E T(Z,)( w) c ( Ll E,T(Zi))( w). Since w and A are arbitrary, we 
conclude that T( U E ,Zi) L U T'p Zi). 0 
This theorem and proof would remain true if we lifted the restriction that 
programs were finite. Making programs infinite will not harm the continuity of T. 
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem [l], the least fixed point of T is given by the 
equation 
Tm(Z1):= T(Z,) t-l T’(Z,) U T3(Z,) U . . . . 
The following theorem can now be proved. 
Theorem 6. Zf 9 is a closed program and G is a closed goal formula, then 9 to G if 
and onZy if T”(Z,), PI!= G. 
PROOF. First we show that PI-, G implies T”O(Z,), 91~ G. We do this by showing 
by induction on k that for all programs B and all closed goal formulas G, if the 
sequent S-, G has a O-proof of height k, then Tm(Z,), 91b G. 
Base case: k = 1. G must be atomic and G E [PI. Thus, G E T’(ZJ9) c 
T”( Z,)(9) and Tm(Z,), 9lt= G. 
Inductive case: k > 1. We need to consider the cases where the last inference in 
the O-proof of l? + G is an instance of one of the inference figures (2)-(6). We 
present only the cases corresponding to inference figures (2) and (6). The other three 
cases are straightforward. 
Assume that the last inference figure was (2). Then G is atomic and there is a 
G’ II) G E [Pa] such that P-, G’ has an O-proof of height k - 1. By the inductive 
hypothesis, T”(Z,), B IF G’. By the definition of T, G E T(Tm(Zl))(P) = 
Tm( Z,)(9). Hence, T”(Z,), Pi!= G. 
Assume that the last inference figure was (6). Thus G is of the form D 3 G’ and 
8, D -+ G’ has an O-proof of height k - 1. By the inductive hypothesis, T”(Z,), 9 
U {D } Ii= G’. Hence, T”O(Z,), 9lk D 3 G’. 
We now prove the converse. Let 9 and G be such that Tk(Z,), 9lk G for some 
k 2 1, and assume that this is the smallest such value for k. If G contains n 2 0 
occurrences of logical connectives and quantifiers, we then attach to the pair 9, G 
the ordinal measure w. (k - 1) + n. We now prove by induction on this measure 
that for all programs 9 and all closed goal formulas G, if the measure of the pair 
B, G is a, then PI-,G. 
Base case: the measure of 9, G is 0 (= w + 0 + 0). G is therefore atomic, and 
T’(Z,), 811= G. But then G E [9] and P!-, G. 
Inductive case: the measure of 9, G is 0. a + j3 > 0. This case must be divided 
between the case where this ordinal is a limit ordinal or not, i.e., /3 = 0 or j3 > 0. 
Subcase /3 = 0. Hence, a > 0 and G is atomic. Thus Tn+‘(Z,), Blk G and 
G E Ta+‘( Z,)(B). By the definition of T, either G E [ 91, in which case PI-, G is 
immediate, or there is a closed G’ 2 G E [P] such that T”( Z,), 91b G’. In the 
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second case, the ordinal w + (a - 1) + /3’, where /3’ is the number of logical connec- 
tives in G’, is smaller than w. a + p. By the inductive hypothesis, PI-, G’ has an 
O-proof, so 91-o G has an O-proof by proof rule (2). 
Subcase /3 > 0. In this case, G is not atomic. This part of the proof, therefore, 
breaks into four cases, one for each possible top-level connective of G. The proof of 
each of these cases in straightforward and omitted here. 
Finally, if T”(I,), 81~ G, then by Lemma 3 there is a k 2 1 such that 
T“( I,), 91i= G. Hence, the pair 9, G has a measure, and by the preceding inductive 
proof, this implies that Pk-,G. 0 
A similar theorem for the classical theory of positive Horn clauses is given in [l]. 
The fixed-point result in that paper can be viewed as a special case of Theorem 6. 
6. PROOF THEORY 
At this point, we would like to know if our programming language represents a new 
logical system or if it is an instance of some other known logical system. The 
purpose of this section is to address this question. 
It is worthwhile noting that our emphasis here is different than what is generally 
found in theoretical discussions of logic programming. The more common approach 
starts with a specific logic, namely classical first-order logic, and then examines the 
programming-language significance of that logic’s metatheory. Our approach in this 
paper is the reverse, that is, we first fixed a natural and interesting programming 
language and then looked for a logic whose metatheory includes its operational 
semantics. This step of looking for such a logic is not meant to justify the 
programming language-it is justified to the extent that it has formal properties and 
implements important programming features. We wish instead to discover if our 
logic has been studied previously in the logic literature. 
We have already mentioned that if to represents a provability relation in some 
logic, that logic cannot be classical ogic. For another illustration of this, consider 
the goal formula G, v (D 3 G2). Our operational semantics interprets this goal as 
one which will succeed if either G, succeeds or if G, succeeds given the program in 
D. The scope of D is clearly over G, only. Classical ogic, however, does not support 
this interpretation of this goal. For example, in classical logic, the following 
equivalences are tautologous: 
G,v(D3G,)=G,v -DvG, 
=-DvG,vG, 
The classical equivalence of p I q with -p V q undermines the intended meaning 
of implication as providing an environment building mechanism. We will show how 
two weaker logics, minimal logic and intuitionistic logic, can be used to provide a 
justification for our intended interpretation of the logical connectives. 
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We now present a different set of inference figures for sequents than those 
introduced in Section 1. This proof system is taken from [18]. 
l?-+A,B r+A,C 
l’-+A,Br\C 
A -R 
B,C,A+O 
BAC,A+O 
A -L 
B,A-,@ C,A+O 
BvC,A+O 
r+A,B 
r+A,BvC 
v -R 
T+O,B C,r+A 
B3C,l?-tAuO 
V-L 
r+A,C 
r+A,BvC 
v-R 
B,I-+O,C 
3 -L 
l?+O,BIlC 
3-R 
r,[x/t]P -+ 0 
r,vxwO 
V-L 
r+O,gxp 
3-n 
Lb/YIP -+ 0 3_L r + o,bhlp 
r,3xp-*0 r+O,vxp 
V-R 
r-,0,1 
T+O,B 
1-R 
The proviso that the variable y is not free in any formula of the lower sequent is 
also assumed for the 3-L and V-R figures. 
A proof for the sequent r + 0 is a finite tree constructed using these inference 
figures and such that the root is labeled with r + 0 and the leaves are labeled with 
initial sequents, i.e., sequents r -+ 0 such that the intersection r n 0 contains either 
I or an atomic formula. 
Sequent systems of this kind generally have three structural figures which we 
have not listed. Two such figures, interchange and contraction, are not necessary 
here, because the antecedents and succedents of sequents are sets instead of lists. 
Hence, the order and multiplicity of formulas in sequents are not made explicit. If 
an antecedent is of the form r, B, it may be the case that B E r; that is, a formula 
in an antecedent or succedent has an arbitrary multiplicity. The third common 
structural inference figure is that of thinning: from a given sequent one may add any 
additional formulas to the succedent and antecedent. The following lemma, which 
can be proved easily by induction, establishes a form of antecedent thinning which 
we will find useful. We will not, however, introduce thinning as a separate inference 
figure. 
Lemma 7. Let Z be a proof of r --, 0, and let r’ be a set of formulas. Let E + r’ be 
the tree of sequents obtained by adding r’ to the antecedent of all sequents in 5. 
Then E + y’ is a proof for r u rf -+ 0. 
We define the following three kinds of proofs. Any proof will also be called a 
C-proof. Any C-proof such that every sequent in it has a singleton set for its 
succedent is also called an I-proof. Furthermore, an I-proof in which no instance of 
the I -R inference figure appears is also called an M-proof. Sequent proofs in 
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classical C, intuitionistic I, and minimal M logics are represented, respectively, by 
C-proofs, I-proofs, and M-proofs. Finally, we write P t, B, r I-, B, or r t, B if 
the sequent P + B has, respectively, a C-proof, I-proof, or M-proof. It follows 
immediately that l? k.M B implies P kI B implies P t-= B. If the set P is empty, it 
will be dropped entirely from the left side of these three predicates. See [5,9,18,21] 
for more on intuitionistic and minimal logics. 
The following is a C-proof for a formula we considered in Section 1: 
Similarly, the following is a C-proof of Peirce’s formula, mentioned at the end of 
Section 3: 
P-+Pt4 
1 -R 
-+P,PI4 p-+p 2-L 
(P=+P-)P 
+((P~4)3P)3P3-R. 
Neither of these formulas has an I-proof. 
In classical proofs, there may be more than one formula in the succedent, and the 
“processing” of any one of these formulas may interact with the others in the 
succedent. This is very clear if we return to the goal formula, G, V (D 3 G2), 
presented earlier. Consider the following tree of sequents: 
D-,G,,G, 
1 -K 
+ G,, D 3 G2 
+G~,G~@IGZ) 
V-R 
+G,V(DIG,) 
v-R 
This reduction of the root sequent to D + G,, G, loses the scoping restriction of D 
over G,. Permitting more than one formula on the right works against our intented 
interpretation of the logical connectives. 
Theorem 8. Let 9 be a set of definite clauses, and let G be a goal formula. If 9~o G, 
then PI-,,,, G, P t, G, and 9~, G. 
PROOF. Each of the inference figures (2) through (6) is derivable in M in the 
following way. Figure (2) is a combination of V-L, A -L, 3 -L, and an initial 
sequent; figure (3) is V -R; figure (4) is A -R; figure (5) is 3-R; figure (6) is 2 -R. An 
initial sequent of E. is derivable using V-L, A-L, and an initial sequent of this 
system. Since all these inference figures are derivable in the weakest system, M, they 
are also derivable in I and C. q 
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The proofs of the next two lemmas are straightforward inductions on the height 
of proofs. 
Lemma 9. Let 9 be a set of definite clauses and 0 be a set of goal formulas. Any 
proof of a sequent B + 0 contains no instances of the inference figures V -L, 3-L, 
and Q-R. 
Lemma 10. Let 9 be a set of dejinite clauses. There is no I-proof of the sequent 
94-l. 
From Lemma 10 it follows that any I-proof of 9-t 0 cannot contain any 
instances of the _!_ -R inference figure. Hence, for a set of definite clauses $3’ and a 
goal formula G, PI--, G if and only if Bt, G. 
We now wish to show that if 9+ G is intuitionistically provable, it is then 
operationally provable. There are several overlaps between the 0 and I proof 
systems, but there are two substantial differences. First, there are no O-proof 
inference figures which correspond to V-L and A -L. This difference is compensated 
by the use of [9] instead of 9 in proof rules (1) and (2). Secondly, and more 
importantly, the match between inference figures (2) and 1 -L is not direct. Given 
the sequent G’ 3 A, 9+ G, (2) is applicable only if G = A, while 3 -L has no such 
restriction. In fact, 3 -L generates an entire subproof for A, 9-+ G which is not 
present in instances of inference figure (2). As a result of this difference, we need to 
make the following definitions and observations. 
Instances of 3 -L in a proof are at the root of two smaller proofs. These two 
proofs are called the left subproof and right subproof of this instance of 3 -L. An 
instance of 3 -L in a proof is simple if its right subproof has height 1. Otherwise, 
the instance is complex. A proof in which all instances of 3 -L are simple is a 
simple proof. It is simple instances of 3 -L which correspond to uses of inference 
figure (2). Lemma 12 establishes that simple I-proofs are sufficient. First, however, 
we need to prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 11. Assume that Z is an I-proof of the form 
where E, and E, are simple I-proofs. There exists a simple I-proof for 
G’IA,~+G. 
PROOF. Our proof shows how a complex instance of 3 -L can be converted to 
simple instances by moving it backwards through the inference figures in E,. To do 
this, we need to show that 3 -L “commutes” with all inference figures in which Zz 
can terminate. Formally, the proof is by induction on the height of Zz. If the height 
is 1, then the instance of 3) -L above is simple and we are finished. Assume that the 
height of Ez is greater than 1. We now show that this complex instance of 3 -L 
commutes with the last inference figure in E,. We consider the cases for each such 
inference figure. 
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Cases A-R, 3 -R, V-R, and 3-R: Assume that the root inference figure in E2 
is A-R. Hence, E is of the form 
zr =rr 
zr 
P-+ G’ 
A,ZG, A, ;i G, 
A-R 
A, B-, G, A G, 
G’IA,~+G,AG, 
Consider the following I-proof: 
3 -L. 
The two instances of 3 -L above both have left and right subproofs which are 
simple and are such that their right subproofs are shorter than E,. The inductive 
hypothesis can be applied to each subproof to finish this case. The case when the 
last inference figure of Z2 is either 3 -R, V-R, or 3-R is similar. 
Cases ‘d-L and A -L: Assume that the root inference figure in Z2 is V-L. Hence, 
Z is of the form 
T 
-1 
VxD,B’-+ G’ 
A, [x/t]D, 9’ -+ G 
V-L 
A,Vx D, 9’ + G 
G’~A,VxD,9”-tG 
3 -L, 
where 9= 9’ U {Vx D }. Consider the following I-proof: 
% + {[x/@) Z:; + {VxD} 
[x/~]D,vxD, P+ G’ A,[x/t]D,VxD,P+ G 
G’IA,VXD,[~/~]D,~‘+G 
3 -L 
G’IA,VXD,LP’-* G 
V-L. 
The instance of 3 -L above has left and right subproofs which are simple and is 
such that its right subproof is shorter than E,. The inductive hypothesis can be 
applied to this instance of 3 -L to finish this case. The case when the last inference 
figure of E2 is A-L is similar. 
Case 3 -L For our final case, assume that the last inference figure of E2 is 
3 -L. Then Z ’ IS of the form 
2 
El 
L 
G,IA,,Y+G’ 
A,.P+G, A, A,, 9’ + G 
3 -L 
A,G,IA,,@‘+G 
G’IA,G,IA,,P+G 
3 -L, 
where B= {G, 3 A,} U 9’. Since the uppermost instance of 3 -L is simple, the 
sequent A, A,, 9 + G is initial. Hence, either G E 9’, G = A, or G = A,. If G E 9’, 
then a simple I-proof for the sequent 
G’IA,G,IA,,~‘+G 
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is the one node proof labeled with just this sequent. If G = A, then a simple I-proof 
for this sequent would be 
E, 
G,~A,,P+G A,G,IA,,S’+G 
G’IA,G,IA,,P-,G 
3 -L. 
Finally, if G = A,, then consider the following I-proof: 
E, Z:;+ {G,x4,} 
G,IA,,~‘+G’ A,GIIAAl,P-,G1 
G”IA,G,IA,,~‘+G, 
3 -L A,,G’IA,P-,G 
3 -L. 
G’s,A,G,IAA,,8’+G 
The lower instance of 1 -L is simple, while the upper instance is not necessarily 
simple. Since that instance’s right subproof is shorter than E2, the inductive 
hypothesis can be used to complete this case. 0 
Lemma 12. Let 9 be a set of definite clauses, and let G be a goal formula. If 9+ G 
has an I-proof, it has a simple I-proof. 
PROOF. This follows by induction on the number of complex instances of 2 -L in 
an I-proof of 8+ G. If the number of such instances is greater than 0, choose one 
which has only simple left and right subproofs. Using the preceding lemma, that 
instance can be removed. The resulting I-proof has one fewer complex instance. In 
this fashion, all complex instances can be removed. 0 
Theorem 13. Let 9 be a set of dejkite clauses, and let G be a goal formula. 9 k. G if 
and only if PF, G if and only if Pt-, G. 
PROOF. We need only show one remaining implication, namely, if 9+, G then 
91-o G. We first prove by induction on the height of E that if E is a simple I-proof 
for 9” + G and [S’] c [9’], then there exists an O-proof for 9+ G. We may 
assume that no internal sequents in E are instances of initial sequents, since if there 
were such a sequent, the proof could be simplified by removing the subproofs above 
it. If the height of Z is one, i.e., it is simply an initial sequent, then G is atomic and 
G E [S’]. Hence, G E [PI, and 94 G is an initial sequent for k0 . This single 
sequent is the desired O-proof. 
Now assume that the height of Z is greater than 1, and let E,, and if necessary 
Z,, be the I-proofs which arise from deleting the last inference figure of E. We need 
to consider the following seven cases-one for each inference figure in which E can 
terminate. 
Cases V-R, A-R, S-R: Let the last inference figure of Z be A-R. Here, G is 
G, A G,; so E1 is a proof of 9’ + G, and E, is a proof of 9’ + G,. By the 
inductive hypothesis, let T1 and T2 be O-proofs for, respectively, P+ G, and 
9+ G,. The necessary O-proof for B + G, A G, results from appending inference 
figure (4) to the trees T1 and T,. The cases for V -R and 3-R are similar. These cases 
use inference figures (3) and (5), respectively, instead of (4). 
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Case 1 -R: Let the last inference figure of Z be 3 -R. Here, G is D 3 G,; so 
E, is a’ proof of 9’, D + G,. By the inductive hypothesis, let 7’i be an O-proof for 
9, D --, G,. We may apply the inductive hypothesis, since [S’] c [9] implies 
[S’, D] 5 [P, D]. The necessary O-proof for 9-t D 3 G, results from appending 
inference figure (6) to Ti. 
Cases V-L and A-L: Let the last inference figure of E be V-L. Hence, 
9’ = {VxD} U 9” for some set P’, and Zi is a proof of Y’, [x/t]D --* G for some 
term t. The inductive hypothesis immediately supplies the necessary O-proof for 
9 -+ G. We may apply the inductive hypothesis, since [S’] c [Pa] implies 
[S”, [x/t]D] c [9]. The case for the inference figure A -L is similar. 
Case I -L: Let the last inference figure of Z be 1 -L. Hence, 9’ = {G’ XJ A } 
U 9” for some 9”‘. Then Z must be of the form 
H, z2 
9” -+ G’ A,S”-+ G 
G’IA,S”+G 
3 -L. 
Since 5 is simple, A, 9’ + G must be an initial sequent. This forces G = A since 
otherwise G E 9” and the root sequent of Z would be an initial sequent, contradict- 
ing our assumption about 2:. By the inductive hypothesis, let r, be an O-proof for 
9’+ G’. We may apply the inductive hypothesis, since [P’] c [.P] implies [P’] c 
[PI. Since G’ 3 A E P’, we have G’ 3 A E [LPI and the necessary O-proof results 
from appending an instance of inference figure (2) to Tl. 
Finally, let PI--, G. Then 9+ G has a simple I-proof. By the proof above, and 
since [@I c [PI, 9+ G has an O-proof and .Pk,G. 0 
Throughout this section, the differences between minimal-logic and intuitionistic- 
logic proofs were not evident. This is because goal formulas and definite clauses 
contain no instances of negations or _L . In the next section, we introduce negation 
to our programming logic. As we shall see, there are two natural interpretations of 
this negation; one interpretation is equivalent to minimal logic and the other to 
intuitionistic logic. 
7. MINIMAL-LOGIC NEGATION 
Let us now permit the logical constant I to occur in both goals and definite clauses 
as if it were considered an atomic formula. More precisely, for this section, consider 
definite clauses and goal formulas to be defined by the following mutually recursive 
definition: 
D := I lA[G 3 A(G I I (VxDID, A D,, 
G := I (A(G, A G,IG, V G,(3xG(D I G. 
Formulas of the form B 3 I will be abbreviated as -B. Thus, the negation of a 
goal formula is a definite clause, and the negation of a definite clause is a goal 
formula. Operationally, let us treat I just as if it were an atomic formula. Hence, 
with this simple or “minimal” view of I , we can easily add the following two proof 
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rules to handle the case where I is a goal: 
(7) Bt, I if I E [Z?]. 
(8) 81-o I if there is a formula (G 3 I) E [@I and 9~oG. 
We need to add to the O-proof system two inference figures corresponding to (7) 
and (8). This extension, however, is really not an extension at all. A reasonable 
implementation of rules (l)-(8) would, in fact, treat I as a nonlogical predicate 
symbol and simply use rules (l)-(6). 
Proof rule (8) asserts that I follows from 9 if there is a formula G for which 
both - G E [g’] and G follows from 8. For this reason, we shall say that 9 is 
inconsistent if Bl-, I . If 9 is not inconsistent, it is consistent. 
The inconsistency of a set of definite clauses 9 does not necessarily mean that B 
O-proves all (goal) formulas. For example, it is very easy to show that p A -p I-~ I 
while it is not the case that p A -p I-~ q. Hence, inconsistencies are essentially 
“local”. As the next theorem shows, this view of negation is that of minimal logic 
and not that of intuitionistic logic. 
Theorem 14. BI-,G if and only if 9t--, G. There are goals, for example (p A -p) 
I q, which are intuitionistically provable but not provable in 0. 
PROOF. Let Z be an O-proof for @+ G. Let 6’, B’, and G’ be the result of 
replacing every instance of I in E, 9, and G by some 0-ary predicate symbol, say 
F, which does not occur in S. Clearly, Z’ is an O-proof of the sequent 9’ --, G’. By 
Theorem 13, there is an M-proof T for this same sequent. Finally, if we replace all 
the occurrences of F with I in T to get T’, then T’ is an M-proof for 9-+ G. The 
proof of the converse is similar. •I 
It is a simple matter to strengthen the proof system 0 so that I and negation 
are equivalent to that of intuitionistic logic. This is done by adding a proof rule 
which encodes the _L -R inference figure. That is, we need to add the rule which says 
that any goal formula is provable if I is provable. Let 0’ be the proof system 
which is the result of adding the following proof rule to those of 0: 
(9) 8ko, G if PI--,, I. 
It is easy to see, in fact, that p, -p ko, q. In fact, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 15. @t-o, G if and only if PI-, G. 
PROOF. The proofs for Lemmas 11 and 12 and for Theorem 13 can be extended to 
deal with I-proofs which contain the inference figure I -R. These extended lemmas 
and theorem prove this theorem because proof rule (9) corresponds exactly to I -R 
for I-proofs. 0 
The choice of which interpretation of I and negation is made would seem to 
depend very much on what applications are written in this language. In an 
application where it is very important to know whenever a program becomes 
inconsistent, the minimal-logic interpretation is probably the most appropriate. In 
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such a case, it might seem meaningless to be deriving all goal formulas from a 
program which is inconsistent. Such an application would probably be more 
concerned with dealing with the inconsistency itself than with continuing to do 
inferencing with it. On the other hand, if there are some reasoning processes which 
involve many instances of assuming hypotheses during a single process, then the 
intuitionistic interpretation might be more natural. This is because the construction 
of nested proofs often makes use of contradictions to help draw conclusions. For 
example, the goal formula 
has an I-proof but no M-proof. The proof of this goal contains a subproof which 
proves a contradiction. That contradiction does not, however, reflect on the environ- 
ment in which the query is initially asked. 
For the rest of this paper, we shall assume that we are using the minimal-logic 
interpretation of I . 
One way to model negation in a logic-programming system is through a metalogi- 
cal principle called negation-by-failure. This principle states that a closed atom can 
be taken as being false if there is no proof of it. While the negation-by-failure 
principle is much stronger than either the minimal logic or intuitionistic logic 
interpretation of negation, we can make a useful partial connection between them. 
If 9 is consistent and 91-o -A, then there can be no proof of A from 9. In a 
consistent program, therefore, PI-, -A implies not A (negation-by-failure). This 
suggests the possibility of replacing certain forms of negation-by-failure with the 
search for proofs of negations. Negation by failure is not completely removed from 
this consideration, because determining that a program is consistent requires deter- 
mining that there is no proof of _L . The following example demonstrates these two 
negation principles. 
Let us consider a very simple database program. Facts within our database will 
be simple, closed atomic formulas. Definite clauses of the form G 3 I will be used 
to represent constraints. For example, consider the following few clauses: 
enrolled(jane,l02). 
enrolled(bi11,lOO). 
_L :- enrolled(X,l0l),enrolled(X,lO2~. 
This tiny database asserts that Jane and Bill are/have been enrolled in 102 and 100, 
respectively. There is also a constraint that states that it is inconsistent for the same 
person to be enrolled in both 101 and 102. Now consider the following simple 
database program. 
db :- read(Command1, do(Command1, db. 
do(enter(Fact)) :- Fact q > db. 
dotretract) :- fail. 
do(commit) :- repeat. 
do(check(Query)) :- 
(Query, write(yes),nl,!; 
Query => I,write(no),nl,!; 
writet'no, but it could be true'),nl). 
do(consis) :- (not I, writelyes),!; write(no>),nl. 
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Here, db represents a looping database query and updating program. Providing the 
command enter ( F a c t 1 to db makes an update to the current database by calling 
db after it has made Fat t a hypothesis. It is possible to retract such updates by 
using the ret rat t command. This command simply fails. All updates will be 
undone backwards to the point of the last commi t command. The commi t 
command will always resucceed (given, of course, a depth-first interpreter). 
It is the c h e c k command which is most interesting here. It has a three-valued 
behavior. Assume that the database is consistent. The command c hec k( Que ry 1 
will first look for a proof of Query, and if one is found, prints “yes”. Otherwise, a 
proof for the negation of Query, i.e., Query = > I, is searched for. (This goal 
means: “if Query were true, do we have an inconsistency?“) If a proof is found, 
then “no” is printed. If neither the positive nor negative form of Query can be 
proved, then the database does not contain Query although it is consistent for 
Query to be a fact in some extension of that database. If the current database is 
inconsistent, the conclusions drawn by the check command could be wrong. With 
respect to the above database, the three commands 
would print the answers “yes”, “no” and “no, but it could be true”, respectively. 
The cons i s command uses negation-by-failure to determine if the current 
database is consistent. The use of not here is metalogical and not accounted for by 
the theory we have presented. 
The model presented in Section 5 is rich enough to model this three-valued 
behavior. Let 9 be a consistent program and let A be a closed atom. Clearly we 
have either A E T”(Z,)(S) or A @ T”(Z,)(B). The first case is true when 
c hec k(A 1 prints “yes”. The latter case, however, can be broken into two addi- 
tional cases. Clearly, there is some program larger than 9 in which A is true 
(9’~ {A}, for example). Given our classification of worlds into consistent and 
inconsistent, we can make further distinctions: Either the only extensions of the 
world 9’ which contain A are inconsistent, or this is not so. The first case is true 
when check(A) prints “no”, and the latter case is true when check (A 1 prints 
“no, but it could be true”. 
8. REMOVING DISJUNCTIONS FROM PROGRAMS 
In this section, we show that disjunctions are not needed in writing programs. That 
is, for every program there is a second program, generally much larger, which proves 
the same atomic formulas and which contains no occurrences of disjunctions. This is 
true for simple Horn clauses as well as definite clauses. 
We define two functions, dnf which maps goal formulas to sets of goal formulas, 
and dfnf which maps definite clauses to sets of definite clauses, by mutual recursion. 
The expressions A.9? and V.93 denote, respectively, the conjunction and disjunction 
of the formulas in 33 in some fixed but arbitrary order. The two acronyms, dnf and 
dfnf, stand for the disjunctive normal form and the disjunction-free normal form, 
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respectively. These are defined as follows: 
dnf(A) =dfnf(A) = {A}, 
dnf(G, V G2) = dnf(G,) U dnf( G2), 
dnf( G, A G,) = {G’ A G”]G’ E dnf( G,), G” E dnf( G,)} , 
dnf(3xG) = (3xG’IG’Ednf(G)}, 
dnf(DIG)= ((Adfnf(D))IG’lG’Ednf(G)). 
dfnf(GIA) = {G’IA]G’Ednf(G)}, 
dfnf( D, A D2) = dfnf( Dl) U dfnf( D2), 
dfnf(VxD) = {VxD’]D’~dfnf(D)}. 
If 9 is a set of definite clauses, then we shall also write dfnf( 9) = U{dfnf( D)jD E 
9}. It is easy to see that the formulas in the sets dnf(G) and dfnf(9) contain no 
occurrences of disjunctions. The following lemma has a straightforward proof, 
which is omitted. 
Lemma 16. Let 9 be a set of definite clauses. Then each of the following is true. 
(1) A E [@I ifand only ifA E [dfnf(g)]. 
(2) G 3 A E [9] if and only if G’ 3 A E [dfnf(B)] for each G’ E dnf(G). 
(3) G’ E dnf([x/t]G) if and only if there is a 3x G” E dnf(3x G) such that 
G’ = [ x/t]G” 
The main result concerning dnf and dfnf is given by the following theorem. 
Theorem 17. 9 + G has an O-proof if and onb iffor some G’ E dnf(G), dfnf( 9) + G’ 
has an O-proof. 
PROOF. Let Z be an O-proof for 9’-+ G. We proceed by induction on the height 
of z. 
Case: Z . IS an initial sequent. In that case, G is atomic and G E [.9]_ By Lemma 
16, G E [dfnf(9)] and dfnf(9) + G is also an initial sequent. 
Case: E ends in inference$gure (2). Thus, G is atomic and there is a G’ 2 G E 
[9] such that 9+ G’ has a shorter O-proof. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a 
G” E dnf( G’) such that dfnf( S) -+ G” has an O-proof. Again, by Lemma 16, 
G” ZJ G E [dfnf(8)], so dfnf(9) + G has an O-proof. 
Case: 2 ends in inference figure (3). Thus, G is a disjunction, G, V G,, and for 
i = 1 or i = 2, 9’+ Gi has a shorter O-proof. Hence, for some G’ E dnf(Gi), 
dfnf(9) -+ G’ has an O-proof. Since G’ E dnf(G), we are finished. 
Case: E ends in inference$gure (4). Thus, G is a conjunction, G, A G,, and for 
i = 1 and i = 2, 9+ Gi has a shorter proof than Z. By the inductive hypothesis, 
there are formulas G; E dnf(G,) and G; E dnf(G,) such that dfnf( S) + Gi and 
dfnf(9) + G; have O-proofs. Thus, dfnf(B) -+ G; A G; also has an O-proof. Since 
Gi A G2/ E dnf(G), we are finished. 
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Case: E ends in inference jigure (5). Thus, G is an existentially quantified 
formula, 3x G,, and for some term t, 9+ [x/t]G, has a shorter O-proof. Hence, 
for some G’ E dnf([x/t]G,), dfnf( S) + G’ has an O-proof. By Lemma 16, G’ is of 
the form [x/t]G”, where 3x G” E dnf(!lx G,). This completes this case. 
Case: E ends in inference figure (6). Thus, G is an implication, say D 3 G,. 
Since 9, D + G, has a smaller O-proof, there is a G’ E dnf(G,) such that 
dfnf( B, D) + G’ has an O-proof. Since dfnf(9, D) = dfnf(Y) U dfnf( D), the se- 
quent dfnf(9), Adfnf( D) --) G’ has an O-proof. By applying an instance of infer- 
ence figure (6) to this proof, we have an O-proof for dfnf(9) -+ [Adfnf( D)] 3 G’. 
Since [hdfnf( D)] 3 G’ E dnf(G), we have completed this case. 
The proof of the converse is similar and is omitted. 0 
A simple corollary of this theorem is that the two programs 9 and dfnf(9) 
prove the same atomic formulas. 
9. RELATED WORK 
Many of the results in this paper were first presented in [12]. The papers [13] and 
[15] are direct extensions of the logic presented in this paper. In particular, they 
introduce a class of formulas, call hereditary Harrop formulas, which properly 
contains both Horn clauses and the logic of this paper. Hereditary Harrop formulas 
can be defined for both first-order and higher-order logic. 
Gabbay and Reyle in [7] have described a logical language very similar to the one 
presented here. Their motivation for selecting this logic was largely based on the 
observation that this language captures more of its own metatheory. For example, 
the demo predicate of [2] could be encoded directly using implication. That is, the 
goal, demo (D, G), which should succeed if the goal G is provable from D, is 
equivalent to the goal D 3 G. 
Warren in [22] investigated a simpler version of this logic as a basis of a “pure” 
implementation of a database updating program, such as the one in Section 7. He 
essentially used implications within goals only when the hypothesis of that implica- 
tion is atomic. His “modal” operator as.sumeU )@G notation could be approxi- 
mated within our language as A 3 G. Warren also provides a semantics for this 
operator using possible-worlds emantics. 
A stronger logical language, which includes full intuitionistic negation and goals 
which are universally quantified, is investigated by McCarty in [ll]. McCarty uses 
this logic as the basis for building knowledge representation and common-sense 
reasoning programs. He also presents a fixed-point construction and a tableau proof 
procedure for his logic. 
Several papers have dealt with designing modules for logic-programming lan- 
guages. For example, Bowen and Weinberg in [3] have extended the work of Bowen 
and Kowalski in [2] and presented several very interesting programs using a notion 
similar to modules. Chomicki and Minsky in [4] have shown the importance of 
introducing modularity into PROLOG programs and developed a rule-based secu- 
rity system for controlling access among various fragments of code. Neither of these 
papers, however, provided a logical analysis of their respective notions of modules. 
The theoretical results in this paper should provide a basis for such an analysis. 
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O’Keefe in [17] presents a formal approach to developing modules for PROLOG. 
Much of what he presents in that paper can be captured by the theory presented in 
this paper. See, for example, our earlier discussion in Section 4 regarding breeze 
bricks. Nait Abdallah in [16] presents a logical approach to introducing module-like 
procedures. His approach is to base logic programming within a fragment of 
second-order logic and to use second-order quantifiers as an abstraction mechanism 
for procedures (predicates). This approach is quite different from our development 
here and from our other work on higher-order logic programming [14]. 
Goguen and Meseguer in [lo] presented a notion of module for a sorted theory of 
Horn clauses with equality. Their modules have Horn clauses associated with them, 
and they provided a mechanism of module importing called enriching. Their notion 
of importing is one of accumulation; that is, if module M 1 imports M,, the clauses 
associated with M, are also associated with M,. Hence, modules are not imported 
simply for private use. Instead, modules form a hierarchy which shows which 
modules are parts of other modules. With the accumulation approach, searching for 
a clause whose head matches a given atomic goal requires searching through all 
modules which are reachable in the use hierarchy from the current module, no 
matter how remote such modules are. Using the more restrictive approach of this 
paper, only those explicitly imported modules are searched. Such a search can, of 
course, be more constrained. 
Several researchers have investigated extensions of positive Horn theories in an 
entirely classical ogic setting. The resulting operational and model-theoretic seman- 
tics are quite different from those investigated here. For example, the HORNLOG 
system of Gallier and Raatz [8] permits programs to be general Horn clauses; that 
is, programs can contain any number of negative clauses. Thus, the database 
constraints described in Section 7 can be written directly as negative Horn clauses. 
Queries asked of such a system, however, may have “disjunctive” answer substitu- 
tions. For example, if HORNLOG were given the query 
it would succeed and provide the disjunctive answer substitution claiming that x 
would get either u or b. The corresponding query in the logic presented here would 
be written as 
(P(U) o(b) ’ 1) ’ 3dpt-d ’ 1) 
and would not be provable, because there is no “simple” answer substitution. 
Fitting in [6] used classical ogic to investigate an extension of Horn clauses which 
contained negations within the body of clauses. His model theory for such clauses 
used partial models (also attributed to Kripke). The operator used in building 
partial models as fixed points, however, is not continuous. Weakening logic from 
classical to intuitionistic is one way to preserve both simple answer substitutions 
and continuous fixed-point operators in extensions to Horn-clause logic. 
We are grateful to Greg Hager, Theme McCarty, Gopalan Nadathur, and Wayne Snyder for valuable 
comments on a previous version of this paper. John Hannan and a reviewer provided valuable comments 
on this version of the paper. 
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